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Municipal
Restructuring
in Québec:
Some Lessons for Maine
by David F. Wihry

With the push to consolidate municipal and school administrative functions growing stronger in Maine, David
Wihry draws upon the recent government consolidation
experiences of the Province of Québec to point out some
“lessons learned” with applicability to Maine. He notes that
any push for substantial municipal restructuring in Maine
will depend on the intensity of public concern over issues
such as tax burden and economic development, and on the
strength of opposing political influences. Wihry suggests
that the local impetus to consolidate may never be strong
enough without vigorous state leadership and incentives to
advance either the discussion of options or the implementation of consolidations in Maine.
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…expanding the
INTRODUCTION

B

udget problems at the state and local levels in
Maine have stimulated discussions about regionalizing local governmental services. While much of
the discussion has focused on primary and secondary
education (for example, see Trostel 2003), the hope
that regionalization might help ease Maine’s fiscal
problems has extended to general-purpose local government services as well (O’Hara 2004; Richert 2003). In
the last year, the Portland Press Herald/Maine Sunday
Telegram (2005a) editorialized in favor of municipal
consolidation, and Governor John E. Baldacci and the
state Legislature have supported policies to encourage
regionalization.1
There are many forms and degrees of regionalization, such as joint purchasing agreements, the practice
of “tuitioning” students to nearby public or private
schools, regional planning councils, and regional development agencies. Regionalization also may be characterized by the degree of state involvement. On one
extreme, the state can rely solely on voluntary cooperation among local governments. Much has been done in
Maine in this regard. For example, most Maine municipalities, defined customarily in New England to include
towns and cities, have reciprocal aid agreements in the
area of fire protection. Several groups of communities
have set up regional solid-waste-disposal systems. And,
in a few instances voluntary consortia of adjoining
municipalities manage regional public transportation
systems. The Maine Municipal Association has reported
numerous instances of inter-municipal cooperation
(Laberge 2003; Maine Municipal Association 2002;
Rooks 2002a,b), and Frank O’Hara (2004: 3) has
highlighted what he refers to as “a veritable swarm
of regional public purpose organizations” that now
coexists in the Portland area. In the other extreme,
the state could require the consolidation of current
municipalities into larger units. One can imagine, for
example, Bangor and its neighboring communities
being required by the state to re-incorporate as a single
general-purpose municipality.
Many observers believe that expanding the
geographic scope of the governmental units providing traditionally “local” services can enhance both
efficiency and equity. However, in Maine, the state

generally has taken a handsgeographic scope
off approach to local government structure (with the
of the governmental
exception being the Sinclair
Act, which led to a wave of
units providing
school district consolidations).
This is in sharp contrast with
traditionally
our neighbor, the Province
of Québec, which has a long
“local” services
history of altering both firstand second-tier governance
can enhance
structures. (See Sidebar, page
42 for a glossary of terms.)
both efficiency
This article examines Québec’s
recent history of municipal
and equity.
restructuring and extrapolates
what Maine can learn from
Québec’s experience as the
state considers various regionalization options.
The article focuses primarily on consolidation or,
as it is often referred to in Canada, “amalgamation.”
The logical impetus for renewed interest in consolidation is straightforward: if increasing the scale of local
general-purpose government by combining governmental units can generate reductions in expenditures
per unit of service with no deterioration in quality,
demands on the property tax might be moderated
and political pressure for increasing state aid to local
governments and school districts might abate. The
argument for consolidation turns primarily on the
concept of scale economies. Intuition suggests that cost
savings are likely to be available from spreading administrative and political decision-making overhead over
larger populations. This argument, in its most general
form, is sufficiently appealing that consolidation has
long been advocated on efficiency grounds alone.
Supporters also have argued that municipal fragmentation leads to inequities in service levels and tax
burdens, especially for residents of central cities relative
to residents of suburban hinterlands. Most recently,
fragmentation is being seen as a contributor to urban
sprawl by inhibiting region-wide planning, land use
regulation, transportation coordination, and economic
development activities. In Canada, an additional rationale has been stressed: that larger, more geographically
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Agglomeration: as distinct from “Census agglomeration,” a
municipal unit in Québec consisting of pre-existing units
linked for the purpose of providing municipal services in
previously consolidated municipalities in which at least one
unit voted to de-consolidate.
Amalgamation: combining pre-existing municipalities, which
then cease to exist. The term is used synonymously with
“consolidation” and “merger.”
Arrondissement: a sub-unit with limited functional responsibilities within the municipalities of Montreal, Québec,
Longueuil, Lévis, Saguenay, and Sherbrooke.
Census agglomeration: Canadian Census unit of analysis:
one or more adjacent municipalities centered on an urban
core of at least 10,000 persons, where component municipalities are linked by commuting flows to the core.
Census metropolitan area: Canadian Census unit of analysis:
one or more adjacent municipalities centered on an urban
core of at least 100,000 persons, where component municipalities are linked by commuting flows to the core.
First-tier governmental units: units such as Maine’s municipalities (comprised of cities and towns) and Québec’s
municipalities consisting of cities, towns, parishes, and
cantons, all of which are traditionally multi-function
governments.
Metropolitan community (MC): governmental units that
overlay multiple municipalities in the Montreal and Québec
City areas.
Municipality: a local (first-tier) general-purpose unit of
government.
Regional County Municipality (RCM): governmental unit
in Québec that overlays multiple first-tier units, analogous
in this respect to Maine counties, but with broader responsibilities.
Second-tier governmental units: Maine’s counties and
Québec’s metropolitan communities (MCs) in the Montreal
and Québec City areas and regional county municipalities
(RCMs). Second-tier government units typically have
a more limited range of functions than first-tier government units.
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encompassing urban areas would reduce some of the
negative effects of inter-municipal competition for
economic development, such as implicit and explicit
subsidies to businesses (Perritaz 2003). One might
question, for example, how many adjoining communities should have industrial or “technology” parks and
economic development staffs, when the jobs they might
create accrue to the entire local region.
STATE AUTHORITY VERSUS
LOCAL INITIATIVE

O

ne issue of key significance to the future of
regionalization is the relative roles of state
authority and local initiative. Municipalities in the
United States are creatures of state government.
(Substitute “provincial” for “state” and the same is true
of Canadian municipalities.) In Maine, as in the other
states, the powers of local governments are defined by
the state. But Maine, like a number of other states, has
granted local units a substantial degree of “home rule”:
the authority to make laws “on all matters...which are
local and municipal in character,” as long as those laws
do not conflict with the Maine Constitution or state
law (Maine Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1). Thus,
in principle, both state government and local governments can take or at least initiate actions relating to
regionalization. More specifically, although municipalities are generally free to enter into cooperative arrangements amongst themselves, they may not combine into
geographically larger units (or secede, for that matter)
without legislative approval.
Nonetheless, there is no legal impediment to
municipalities seeking state approval to de-organize, or
secede. Even sub-sections of municipalities can seek
such approval; some of the Casco Bay islands are such
a recent example. Likewise, there are no legal or constitutional impediments to the state’s encouraging or even
mandating cooperative arrangements or the consolidation of existing municipalities into larger units. In
effect, the playing field is wide open in Maine to either
state or local action—subject to state approval, in some
instances—affecting municipal organization. This fact
raises the obvious question, which will be discussed
later: if regionalization is desirable, which level of
government should take the initiative?
View current & previous issues of MPR at: www.umaine.edu/mcsc/mpr.htm
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COMPARING MUNICIPAL STRUCTURES
IN MAINE AND QUéBEC

A

The range of services delivered by general municipal (first- and second-tier) governments in Québec is
similar to that of Maine’s cities, towns, and counties,
including expenditures on general government, police
and fire protection, roads and public transportation,
health and social services (a relatively minor item),
resource conservation and industrial development, water
supply, sewerage, and solid waste disposal, and miscellaneous other expenditures.2

re Québec and Maine sufficiently similar in
government structure to warrant looking to the
province for insights? On balance, the answer is yes,
although in some respects the two entities differ
significantly.
While Québec’s population is nearly six times that
of Maine, the province has only somewhat more than
twice the number of general-purpose local governTABLE 1: Distribution of Municipalities by Population,
ments. Local governments in Québec serve an average
Maine, 2002
of 6,700 persons, while Maine’s cities and towns
serve an average of only 2,587 persons (Tables 1
Population*
and 2). However, Québec’s relatively high average
	Number of		
Percentage
is heavily influenced by the presence of nine cities
Municipalities	Number
of Total
with populations in excess of 100,000 persons and
Under 2,000
326
247,138
19.5%
seven cities with populations between 50,000 and
2,000
to
9,999
145
630,447
49.8%
100,000.
10,000 to 49,999
17
323,394
25.6%
Maine has only one municipality with a popula50,000 to 100,000
1
64,249
5.1%
tion in excess of 50,000, and nearly 95 percent of
Maine residents live in communities smaller than
100,000 and over
0
0
0.0%
50,000 persons. In Québec, units in this size cateTotal
489
1,265,228
100%
gory serve only 41 percent of the province’s total
*Population as of 2000.
population. In Maine, about 70 percent of the popuSource: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments 2002.
lation is located in municipalities with populations
http://harvester.census. gov/gid/gid_02/asp/results.asp.
less than 10,000. In Québec, the comparable figure
is 24 percent. By these measures, smaller communities play a significantly larger role in Maine than in
Québec. Yet in one regard, smaller communities in
TABLE 2: Distribution of Municipalities by Population,
Québec, 2005
Maine and Québec are similar: the average population size for municipalities under 50,000 is 2,780
Population**
for Québec and 2,461 for Maine. Furthermore, as
	Number of		
Percentage
will become clear later in this article, a significant
Municipalities*	Number
of Total
amount of structural realignment in Québec in
Under 2,000
752
642,447
8.6%
recent years has been in communities with popula2,000 to 9,999
283
1,143,157
15.4%
tions of from 10,000 to 100,000 persons.
In addition, Maine and Québec both have
10,000 to 49,999
59
1,255,716
16.9%
what are referred to in the Canadian literature as
50,000 to 100,000
7
476,336
6.4%
second-tier municipal governments, what we refer
100,000 and over
9
3,921,143
52.7%
to as “counties.” While the structure of county
Total
1,110
7,438,799
100%
governments in Maine—their geographic scope
*Number of municipalities on January 28, 2005.
and functional responsibilities—has been stagnant,
second-tier units have played a substantial role in the
**Population estimates as of December 2004.
re-structuring of responsibility for municipal funcSource: Québec Ministère des Affairs Municipals et Régions.
tions in Québec.
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Mean

758
4,348
19,023
n.a.
n.a.
2,587

Mean

854
4,039
21,283
68,048
435,683
6,702
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General local government in Québec (which does
not include primary and secondary education) relies
heavily on the property tax and intergovernmental
transfers. In 2004, revenue from “property and related
taxes” accounted for about 75 percent of the ownsource revenue of general local governments (first- and
second-tier) in Québec (Statistics Canada 2004). This
included substantial provincial payments in lieu of
taxes, which Maine does not use, and a substantial
contribution from land transfer taxes, which are less
significant in Maine. In Maine in 2004, 78 percent
of total own-source revenue of local governments,
including counties, as in the case of Québec, but also
including local schools, was accounted for by the
property tax (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2005). In
Québec, in the same year, “general and specific transfers,” excluding federal and provincial payments in lieu
of taxes, amounted to 13 percent of total revenue of

…the Canadian provinces at large have
shown much more interest in reshaping
the geographic boundaries and governance
structures of local and regional multi-purpose
governments than have American states.
general local government. If payments in lieu of taxes
were to be treated as transfers, the figure would rise to
18 percent. For school boards, which administer and
support primary and secondary education, property and
related taxes amounted to 53 percent of own-source
revenue, and transfers (overwhelmingly from the provincial government) accounted for 76 percent of total
revenue (Statistics Canada 2006). In Maine, transfers are
a more important source of funding for local government in general than in Québec and a less important
source of funding for schools. In Maine in 2004, intergovernmental transfers amounted to 32 percent of total
local (including schools) general revenue (U.S. Bureau
of the Census 2005). For primary and secondary
44 · Maine Policy Review · Fall 2006

education alone, transfers from state and federal governments accounted for 44.2 percent and 8.2 percent
of revenue in 2002 (U.S. Department of Education
2004). The current goal for state funding is, of course,
55 percent, still well below the percentage of school
funding in Québec derived from the province.
THE QUéBEC EXPERIENCE

1960 to 2000
Québec has had considerable experience in
altering the geographic scope and functional portfolio of municipal governments. In fact, the Canadian
provinces at large have shown much more interest in
reshaping the geographic boundaries and governance
structures of local and regional multi-purpose governments than have American states. Outside of Québec,
notable examples of consolidation include the creation
of Unicity in Winnipeg, Manitoba (1972), which
combined the former city of Winnipeg with 11 other
municipalities; the establishment of Halifax Regional
Municipality (1995), which combined Halifax with
neighboring Dartmouth and three other municipalities; and the creation of the Toronto megacity (1998),
which encompasses seven pre-existing municipalities,
including the former city of Toronto (Sancton 2001;
City of Toronto 2000). Closer to home in geography
and scale, New Brunswick in 1995 created the City of
Miramichi by combining eleven pre-existing municipalities (Vojnovic 1998). But the Province of Québec
has been, by far, the most inclined to re-structure local
government boundaries and functional roles.
Quebéc’s active approach to municipal restructuring extends back to the 1960s, with the creation of
the City of Laval, an amalgamation of 11 pre-existing
municipalities. Provincial legislation forming the new
city followed the recommendation of a report commissioned by the provincial Ministry of Municipal Affairs
(City of Laval n.d.). In 1970 the Union Nationale
government formed three “urban communities”: the
Montreal and Québec Urban Communities and the
Outaouais (Hull-Gatineau) Regional Community. These
second-tier entities, roughly analagous to Maine’s
counties, did not entail municipal amalgamations, but
rather constituted an overlay relative to the pre-existing
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municipalities (Cournoyer 1998). The urban community’s range of functions included public transportation, regional planning, property assessment, uniform
construction standards, and traffic regulation (LeSage
and Garcea n.d.).
In 1979, the province extended second-tier
restructuring well beyond the three major population
concentrations by creating some 95 “regional county
municipalities” (RCMs) to replace the system of relatively weak counties. As in the case of the urban
communities, creation of these larger geographic entities involved no municipal amalgamations; the preexisting municipalities continued to function as the first
tier of municipal government. The portfolio of the
new regional units was initially narrow, focusing largely
on land use planning, but provision was eventually
made for the RCMs to expand their range of services
with the consent of two-thirds of the constituent firsttier units (O’Brien 1993). The governance bodies of
the three urban communities and the RCMs consisted
of representatives of the constituent municipalities, not
of directly elected legislators such as Maine’s county
commissioners (Tindal and Tindal 2000).
While these developments were occurring, the
province was pursuing the amalgamation agenda—the
actual merging of pre-existing first-tier municipalities
into larger units, with the pre-existing units ceasing
to exist—only sporadically and in somewhat tentative
ways. Municipal amalgamation had become a priority
of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs when the Liberal
government assumed power in 1960 after nearly 20
years of what is regularly portrayed as the traditionbound and rural-oriented rule of the Union Nationale
(Hamel and Rousseau 2005). The province authorized
voluntary amalgamations beginning in 1965. However,
even with the provision of some financial incentives,
the impact on the total number of municipalities
was negligible, with a reduction of fewer than 100
municipal units between 1965 and 1971 (Tindal and
Tindal 2000). During the 1970s, an additional 100
or so municipalities were merged at the initiative of
the provincial government, most on an ad hoc basis in
conjunction with various economic development projects (Cournoyer 1998).
The 1980s were characterized more by rhetoric
and exhortation than by action with regard to amalga-

mation. The early part of the decade saw the implementation of the new regional county municipalities
noted above. The encouragement of first-tier municipal
amalgamations has been seen as a hidden agenda in the
creation of the RCMs, but the impact of second-tier
restructuring on first-tier organization has been slight
(Cournoyer 1998), with few first-tier amalgamations
taking place during the 1980s. Amalgamation activity
accelerated somewhat in the 1990s in the context of
steps taken by the province to decentralize government
by “downloading” some expenditure responsibilities to
the local level. Financial incentives to encourage amalgamation were expanded, and the pace of amalgamation accelerated (Cournoyer 1998).
When the Parti Québecois took over the government in 1994, the amalgamation agenda moved to
the forefront. A report sponsored by the Ministry
of Municipal Affairs led to far greater provincial
involvement in stimulating amalgamations, especially
among the smaller units, which were considered to
be economically inefficient (Quesnel 2000). A newly
devised program identified candidates for merger,
boosted financial incentives, and added a stick to
accompany the carrot: reductions in provincial grants
for recalcitrant targeted units. The renewed emphasis
on municipal mergers in the late 1990s appears to have
had an impact, with 103 municipalities melding into
49 new units (Quesnel 2000).

2000 to the Present Day
The groundwork for a quantum leap in provincial
efforts to change municipal structures was laid in a
1999 commission report (the Bédard Commission) and
a subsequent Ministry of Municipal Affairs white paper
outlining specific structural adjustments and corresponding processes. The minister’s plan and subsequent
legislation led to actions affecting both the first and
second tiers of municipal government
First-Tier Amalgamations
Legislation authorizing the government to force
municipal amalgamations was passed in 2000. The
legislation established processes whereby municipalities
or the province itself could initiate consideration for
amalgamation. In either case, the province was granted
the ultimate authority to require amalgamations to
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occur in accord with the judgments of the Ministry
of Municipal Affairs, regardless of local sentiment.
In 2001 and 2002, amalgamations were mandated
for 205 pre-existing municipalities, resulting in the
creation of 40 new municipalities, with a net reduction of 165 first-tier entities (Perritaz 2003; Soucy
2003). These amalgamations occurred in all population
size categories. Ten new units were created in Census
metropolitan areas (defined as urban agglomerations
with core city populations greater than 100,000),
including the new cities of Montreal (incorporating
28 municipalities) and Québec (incorporating 13
municipalities), in total eliminating 90 pre-existing
municipalities. Fifteen new municipalities were created
in areas the Canadian Census refers to as “census urban
agglomerations” (with core city populations between
10,000 and 100,000), replacing 75 units. Fifteen new
units replaced 40 existing units in areas outside of the
Census urban agglomerations. In general, these newly
consolidated municipal governments were intended to
assume the full range of functions previously carried
out by their component entities.
Second-Tier Amalgamations
Changes implemented at the supra-local level were
more complex. Two major steps were taken.
First, provincial legislation created two “metropolitan communities” in the Montreal and Québec
City areas. In both cases, the previously extant “urban
communities” were displaced by units encompassing
larger proportions of the Census metropolitan areas in
which they are located, including 64 municipal units
in the Montreal area and 26 units in the Québec City
area. The apparent rationale was that even the newly
consolidated cities of Montreal and Québec City would
still not be sufficiently encompassing to efficiently
or effectively address some local functions (Perritaz
2003). The metropolitan communities were assigned
jurisdiction in several areas, including “land use planning, public transportation, economic development
(including international economic promotion), supply
and financing of metropolitan facilities and infrastructures, supply and financing of metropolitan services
and activities, sharing out the growth of the property
tax base” (Perritaz 2003: 23; see also Québec Ministère
des Affaires municipales et des Régions 2005). It is
46 · Maine Policy Review · Fall 2006

worth noting that the new metropolitan communities were permitted to out-source the management of
any of these functions, including to municipalities
within their jurisdiction, but would retain planning and
financing responsibility (Canadian Legal Information
Institute 2005a). A council made up of representatives
(not directly elected) of the participating municipalities
governs the metropolitan communities.
Second, the province also restructured and redefined the responsibilities of the pre-existing regional
county municipalities (RCMs). Prior to the reforms,
all RCMs had compulsory (although not necessarily
exclusive) responsibilities in the following areas: land
use planning; funding of local development boards
and participation in their management; management of
local rivers and streams; management of unorganized
territories; and property assessment, in some instances
(Perritaz 2003; Soucy 2003). The RCMs had optional
responsibility in other areas, among them establishment
of regional parks; technical assistance for businesses;
development of an airport or port facility; and regulation of taxis.
The reforms expanded and restructured RCM
responsibilities. Added to the list of compulsory activities were planning and coordination with respect to fire
safety and public security; planning the management
of waste materials; and development of a strategic
plan for economic, social, cultural, and environmental
improvement. Added to the list of optional activities
were regulation of timber harvesting in private forests;
establishment and management of regional parks;
management of waste materials, local roads, public
transportation and public housing; financing of public
housing; designation of equipment, infrastructure and
services that are supra-local and determining their
corresponding means of management and finance. The
authority, existent prior to the reforms, for constituent
municipalities to withdraw from regionalized services
in some fields of jurisdiction was revoked. RCMs
located in the Montreal and Québec urban communities were assigned somewhat more limited responsibilities. The reforms authorized RCMs to choose to elect
the RCM préfet (administrator) by direct popular vote.
Finally, 14 of the newly amalgamated cities were
granted the authority to function as RCMs, having
been deemed geographically comprehensive enough to
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carry out regional responsibilities that otherwise would
have been assigned to an overlying, therefore redundant, RCM.
Backlash and De-Amalgamations
The prospect of forced amalgamations was very
unpopular in some quarters. It was vigorously opposed
by Québec’s two municipal affairs organizations, was
challenged in the courts, and became part of the
political debate that led to the replacement of the
Parti Québecois by the Liberal government of Jean
Charest in April 2003. Following through on its
campaign promise to provide the opportunity for citizens to act directly on the amalgamations, the Charest
government set up a process that led to province-wide
referenda that permitted component municipalities to
vote on whether to stay with their newly formed
consolidated units.
The de-amalgamation process had two stages. In
the first stage, citizens in component municipalities
were offered the opportunity to partition for a referendum on de-amalgamation, with the signatures of 10
percent of registered voters needed to trigger a vote.
In the second stage, referenda were held simultaneously
throughout the province, on June 20, 2004. The referenda asked citizens to vote yes or no on the question:
	Are you in favour of the de-amalgamation of
[the amalgamated entity] and the constitution
of a municipal entity for the sector of [the
component entity], in accordance with the Act
respecting the consultation of citizens with
respect to the territorial reorganization of
certain municipalities? (Québec, Bill 9)
For the proposition to succeed, yes votes would
have to be at least a simple majority of those voting
and equal to or greater than 35 percent of registered
voters.
Prior to the vote, the provincial government sponsored the development and distribution of consultants’
reports on the expected fiscal impact of de-amalgamation on each component municipality. The impact was
expressed as a projected dollar amount and translated
into a projected change in the tax bill for a singlefamily home of average value. It is important to understand that a favorable vote in any one municipality

would not lead to the dissolution of the entire unit in
which it had been incorporated, but rather only to the
individual unit’s withdrawal from the merged entity.
It also is important to understand that the deamalgamation of a unit would not fully restore the
status quo ante in regard to the regional division of
functional responsibilities, however much it would
appear to do so on the surface. The legislation initiating the referendum process, while enabling the
re-constitution of municipalities that approved the
proposition, specifically reallocated significant functional responsibilities away from the reconstituted
municipalities and up to an agglomeration consisting
of all units within the previously consolidated group.
For example, the municipality of Saint-Lambert had
been incorporated by provincial action into the newly
created municipality of Longueuil, along with seven
other pre-existing units, including the pre-existing
municipality of Longueuil. More than enough SaintLambert residents (31 percent) signed the referendum
register, triggering a vote. Nearly 70 percent of the
voters, equal to 41 percent of registered voters in
Saint-Lambert voted in favor of de-amalgamation. The
amalgamated city of Longueuil would still exist, but
Saint-Lambert would be re-incorporated as a separate
municipality, as would three of the other pre-existing
municipalities that had been incorporated into the new
Longueuil. Yet Saint-Lambert would not regain all of
the functions for which it was responsible prior to the
amalgamation.

The prospect of forced amalgamations
was very unpopular in some quarters.
A wide range of traditionally municipal functions would now be carried out at the level of a newly
formed agglomeration consisting of all of the previously amalgamated units. The agglomerated unit would
assume responsibility for most local services within its
pre-referendum boundaries, including police and fire
protection, emergency dispatch (9-1-1), property valuation, public transportation, municipal courts, public
housing, agglomeration-wide roads, water treatment,
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and solid-waste-disposal services (Québec 2004). The
services to be provided by the de-amalgamated units
such as Saint-Lambert would be limited to a narrow list,
including construction permits, neighborhood improvement projects, local water and sewer systems, trash
collection, management of local streets, libraries, local
parks, animal and bicycle licensing, and local power
production and distribution systems (Québec 2004).
Governance at the agglomeration level would be
by a council with municipal representation proportionate to the populations of the component municipalities. A veto is maintained for the core municipal
entity that consists of units that did not choose to deconsolidate. All of the above conditions were spelled
out in documents provided by the province to each
voting municipality. Thus, voters are likely to have been
aware that a positive vote would not completely restore
the organizational structure and distribution of functions that they had experienced prior to the amalgamation/de-amalgamation process.

The forces operating against spontaneous
municipal mergers are very powerful.
Overall, the outcome of the referendum process
was mixed. Of the 213 municipalities in which registers were opened, only 89 (42 percent) generated
enough signatures to trigger a referendum. Of the 89
units holding referenda, 58 (65 percent) emerged with
majority yes votes. But of these, only 31 units had
more than the 35 percent turnout of registered voters
required for the proposition to succeed. Thus, of the
total number of amalgamated units, fewer than 15
percent ultimately qualified for reconstitution. In the
end, 11 agglomerations resulted from the referendum
process. Transition committees have guided adjustment to the new configuration in each case. The new
agglomerations were scheduled to begin functioning on
January 1, 2006.
The balance between centralization and decentralization after the shakeout also is affected to a limited
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degree by the creation of sub-units referred to as
arrondissements in six of the province’s largest cities.
The arrondissements generally coincide with the boundaries of the pre-existing municipalities and are assigned
management responsibilities for a number of services
that are distinctly local in character, such as licensing,
local roads, parks and cultural and recreational resources,
local zoning, and trash removal (Québec Ministère des
Affaires Municipales et des Régions 2005).
Since only 15 percent of the communities were
ultimately deconsolidated, it is tempting to interpret the
outcome of the referendum process as an endorsement
of amalgamation and, by implication, as an endorsement of the activist provincial policy of mandating
amalgamations. While this interpretation is fair overall,
some caution is in order. Although not explicit in the
wording of the referendum question, it should have
been clear to voters that a decision to deconsolidate
would not re-establish the municipality as it had previously existed. The reconstituted municipalities will
have a greatly attenuated role in service provision, with
most of the important local functions to be carried
out by the agglomeration of which they have become
part. Thus, voters were not presented with a clear-cut
alternative of supporting either full amalgamation or
full autonomy. Some citizens, both those in favor of
amalgamation and those opposed, may have chosen not
to take the trouble to sign a referendum register or to
vote, on the assumption that de-amalgamation would
make little or no difference in their lives and that, in
fact, amalgamation to a substantial degree would be the
outcome regardless of the vote count.
The vagueness of the alternative possible outcomes
might explain why only a minority of those communities eligible for a referendum chose to hold one, and
why so few of the municipalities that did hold a referendum reached the 35 percent participation threshold
required for a majority yes vote to be decisive. On the
other hand, those who did go to the polls surely felt
strongly either in support of or in opposition to deamalgamation. The bottom line seems to be that only
a small percentage of communities that could have
chosen de-amalgamation did so, either because the
status quo was seen as the preferred outcome by voters
or because the 35 percent threshold was not met.
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LESSONS FOR MAINE?

Efficiency versus Equity
What aspects of Québec’s experience are noteworthy from Maine’s perspective? One key question is,
of course, whether local government in Québec will be
more efficient and equitable as a result of the steps the
province has taken. If so, then Maine might consider
following Québec’s example. Prospectively, the
consultants’ studies estimated that if all of the forced
amalgamations were undone, on average the affected
communities would experience an 8.5 percent increase
in local taxes. However, retrospectively, it is difficult if
not impossible to determine whether the consolidations and agglomerations will have had any net impact
on the cost of local government. Ideally, consolidation would decrease the cost per unit of the services
supplied by the participating municipalities. However,
a decrease in cost per unit of a service will not necessarily lower total expenditures on that service. In fact,
municipalities might even raise their total spending
on a specific function if unit cost were to fall,3 and an
increase in total spending with population and property
values constant would increase per capita spending and
raise property tax rates. The relationship between unit
cost and total spending is difficult to sort out empirically because the factors influencing local spending are
so complex. Even the impact on unit cost is hard to
discover, since public service outputs are notoriously
difficult to measure.
Moreover, even if consolidation were to decrease
unit cost and lower total local spending without
impairing the level and quality of local public services,
this would not necessarily mean that consolidation
would leave all taxpayers in a region better off.
Consolidation can hurt those citizens whose preferences for public services differ significantly from that
of the typical (technically, the median) voter in the
amalgamated entity. In Maine, we see this phenomenon
at work in the desire on the part of high-propertyvalue segments of communities such the Casco Bay
islands (Portland Press Herald/Maine Sunday Telegram
2005) to secede from their respective municipalities.
This is one reason why those economists who focus

solely on the matter of efficiency, ignoring the equity
implications of fragmented local government structures,
often argue for maximum decentralization in the provision of government services, especially if no scale
economies are available at the regional level.
Decentralization ensures “local control” and permits
spending and tax levels to match local preferences.
Unfortunately, the value foregone from a loss in local
control is intangible; its magnitude is known only to
the voters. If efficiency is the only goal in play,
Québec’s approach of permitting local referenda on
imposed consolidations might make sense for Maine,
since referenda are one way to get an expression of the
value that citizens place on local control.

State Authority/Local Initiative
In interpreting the consolidation/deconsolidation
process in Québec, it is important to understand that
none of the forced consolidations that received the post
facto support of the voters would likely have occurred
spontaneously. The forces operating against spontaneous municipal mergers are very powerful. Principal
among these is the inhibiting influence of local political and appointed officials who stand to lose their jobs
were a merger with neighboring communities to occur.
Since it is they who would have to initiate and conduct
negotiations with potential municipal partners, it is
unlikely, although not impossible, that the consolidation issue will be raised locally at all.
This factor is less of a barrier to negotiations for
regional provision of selected services, such as dispatch
services, since fewer local interests are affected. Despite
showing virtually no interest in outright mergers,
Maine municipalities have a significant history of
developing cooperative agreements and hybrid means
of delivering specific services regionally. (See, for
example, the Maine Municipal Association’s publication, Maine Townsman, for discussions of cooperative regional arrangements in the areas of regional
economic development and police and fire protection.) Also significant are the costs in time and effort
associated with reaching voluntary agreements among
communities, especially if a large number are involved.
These kinds of structural obstacles to spontaneous
mergers are likely to be prohibitive, even if a merger
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would otherwise confer net benefits on citizens. For
this reason, a case can be made that it is up to the
central government, the province or the state, to act.
By this reasoning, if the central government is sufficiently powerful, it can force consolidations that would
yield net benefits to the communities involved, but that
would not occur spontaneously.
WHAT CAN MAINE DO?

I

t seems reasonable to conjecture that there are probably consolidations in Maine that should occur,
i.e., consolidations that would lead to more efficient
production of local public services and would also
win the support of voters. With these considerations
in mind, the Québec experience suggests a course
of action for Maine that has, not surprisingly, both
strengths and weaknesses.

Local Initiative
First, the state could commission studies aimed
at identifying potential municipal amalgamations and
estimating their possible impacts on the cost of public
services.4 A look at the methods used by the several
consultants who carried out Québec Province’s impact
studies might be in order. Certainly there should be a
complete review of existing evidence on the optimal
scale for delivering municipal services, and attention
should be paid to special characteristics of local government in Maine, such as the prevalence of volunteerism
in the delivery of some local services in small towns.
After identifying areas where it is apparent that a
regional approach to providing local services might be
more cost-effective, the state could sponsor referenda
to gauge the level of local support or resistance. This
process could be ongoing and incremental, one target
area at a time; there is no need to undertake consolidations across the board and all at once.
The strength of this study/referendum approach
is that it takes into account both measurable and
non-measurable impacts of consolidation on citizen
welfare. However, the weakness of the approach is that
it provides communities with a chance to opt out of
agglomerations simply because they expect an increase
in their share of the cost of services in the region,
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regardless of whether the unit cost of services could be
lowered overall. This is a serious conundrum. One good
reason to consolidate municipalities is to spread the cost
of shared services over a more comprehensive tax base.
This argument is particularly compelling in the case of
municipal service centers, where suburbanites work and
shop in the core but are taxed in their own jurisdictions. Yet if communities are given a chance to forego
joining a consolidated unit, some will opt out, regardless of efficiency considerations. The reality seems to be
that if greater equity in the distribution of tax burdens
is the goal, consolidation by referendum probably is not
a workable means of achieving it. Redistribution would
have to occur through some other mechanism such as
state grants-in-aid to municipalities.

State Authority
Alternatively, Maine could consider duplicating
the Québec model by first requiring consolidations
and then giving communities the chance to opt out.
Whether the political will exists at the state level to
impose, without up-front local consent, consolidations that threaten vested interests and disadvantage
taxpayers in some municipalities depends on the historical and current political environment. Québec and
Maine differ significantly in this regard. Forced consolidation by provincial action was not politically popular
in Québec, but not sufficiently unpopular either to
prevent it from happening or to cause the consolidations to be totally rolled back.
Forced consolidation is likely to be even less
popular in Maine. Maine has a long and entrenched
history of home rule, to which residents and local officials have adjusted and with which they feel comfortable. Moreover, Maine lacks some of the ideological
and cultural characteristics that seem to have led to a
greater tolerance for central government in Québec.
Québec’s emergence from a rural-dominated
economy, in which the Catholic Church played a
major role in the delivery of public services, into a
modern, more secular society was seen as a revolution,
not a gradual transformation, and seems to have led
to greater tolerance of or even preference for substantial centralized authority. Québec’s bold approach to
municipal restructuring also was probably furthered
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by the province’s parliamentary form of government, which makes it more likely that a particular
government’s agenda would be backed up by legislation enacting it into law (Sancton 2001). Finally, there
seems little doubt that none of the Québec experience
would have happened in the absence of a Ministry of
Municipal Affairs and without the vigorous management of the Minister at the time, Louise Harel (Perritaz
2003; Quesnel 2000).
The broad historical, political, and governmental
context that shaped Québec’s actions in relationship to
its local governments has no counterpart in Maine. Nor
does the executive branch of government in Maine
have the legislative clout that the parliamentary system
confers on the government in Québec.

functions assigned to counties. The state’s labor market
areas, of which there are more than thirty, come to
mind (Maine Department of Labor n.d.). The state
would need to put in place a process for reassessing
county boundaries, a change which is likely to meet
resistance, although fewer actors have vested interests in county than in municipal structures, and there
is no legal foundation for county home rule (Maine
Municipal Association 2005).

Whether Maine government will push for
substantial municipal restructuring will
depend on the intensity of public concern

Restructuring Maine’s Counties
Of particular interest to Maine is the fact that
municipal restructuring in Québec involved secondtier as well as first-tier governments. The province
seems to be comfortable manipulating the role of
county-equivalent entities by expanding the number
of functions they perform and by creating new units
with broader geographic scope. The phrase “regional
county municipality” suggests that the province tends to
think of what we call counties as providing essentially
local services. In fact, provincial laws relating to local
government treat both first- and second-tier units as
“municipalities” (Canadian Legal Information Institute
2005b). The division of local responsibilities between
the first and second tiers of government and the
geographic compass of the second-tier units are seen in
Québec as essentially malleable.
This definitely is not the case in Maine, where
county boundaries are not tampered with and where
counties generally perform a narrow range of services,
essentially law enforcement through sheriff ’s offices
and county jails. (There are exceptions, of course, such
as county involvement in emergency dispatch and the
construction of the Cumberland County Civic Center.)
The functional equivalent of Québec’s actions with
respect to second-tier governments would involve
adjusting county boundaries and the total number of
counties to better fit patterns of economic interdependence and expanding the number and kinds of

with the relevant issues and on the strength
of opposing political influences.
Following the Québec example, new functions
might include the planning, financing, and management of any services that have a region-wide impact
or which require region-wide cooperation in order
to avoid duplication of resources. Careful research
would need to be done to identify those functions that
could be carried out more efficiently and effectively
at a regional level. There is clearly room in Maine for
re-thinking the role of counties, their number, and
their geographic structure. While Québec’s experience is instructive, Maine need only look elsewhere
in the United States for models that rely much more
heavily on counties to provide local and supra-local
services. Alternatively, Maine could follow the lead of
Connecticut, whose counties have no governmental
functions. The state could then create a set of supramunicipal governmental units to which functions
of appropriate scale could be assigned. If a radical
re-structuring of second-tier government in Maine is
not politically feasible, a re-definition of the role of
the existing counties is an alternative. This has been
suggested by Frank O’Hara who has gone as far as to
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list a set of practical steps that
might move the state incrementally in that direction (see
O’Hara 2004).

Moving Forward
There seems to be widespread agreement in Maine
that many municipal problems
require regional solutions.
David F. Wihry is Associate
Whether Maine government
Professor of Economics at the
will push for substantial municipal restructuring will depend
University of Maine. His teaching
on the intensity of public
and research specialization is in
concern with the relevant
public finance, with special emphasis
issues and on the strength of
on the state and local levels. His
opposing political influences.
current research is related to the
The most powerful environinfluence of economic factors on
mental factors that might
bolster an activist state approach
public attitudes toward municipal
to municipal consolidation in
consolidation.
Maine are the state’s relatively
high tax burden, suggesting
some inefficiency in the delivery of government
services, and the state’s concern with economic development. There seems little doubt that efficient and
responsive local government is important to creating
a public sector environment that is supportive of
economic growth. Controlling the principal negative
impact of economic growth—suburban sprawl—also
provides an impetus in Maine to look for regional solutions that might include selective consolidations. It
remains to be seen whether these interests are sufficient
to over-ride sources of resistance to the consolidation
of municipal governments in Maine.
Finally, if Maine is serious about improving the
efficiency and equity of local and county government,
the relationship between efficiency and governmental
structure needs far greater visibility at the state level.
Change will require vigorous leadership. It is evident
that Québec’s Ministry of Municipal Affairs played a
central role in defining the re-structuring agenda and
in furthering its implementation. Maine, of course,
has no comparable agency. The creation of the new
Maine Intergovernmental Advisory Commission is a
step in the right direction, but the Commission is far
52 · Maine Policy Review · Fall 2006

from being the functional equivalent of a cabinet-level
agency. At the very least, the Commission should be
provided with a full-time executive director and additional staff support. At best, the director should hold a
cabinet-level position. Given the inevitable resistance to
significant changes in the structure of sub-state government in Maine and given the absence of the supportive
cultural and ideological climate that seems to have
prevailed in Québec, it seems appropriate to address
restructuring incrementally—so that success can be
demonstrated—but with vigorous leadership from the
highest levels of state government. 
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ENDNOTES
1.	In 2003, Governor Baldacci proposed a set of financial incentives to encourage the voluntary formation
of “municipal service districts,” but the proposal did
not gain legislative approval. The Governor included
$1 million in his FY05-06 budget to fund grants to
localities to plan and implement cooperative public
service delivery arrangements. The Maine Development
Foundation administers the program under contract
with the state. (For the current status of the grant
program see Maine Development Foundation 2006.)
2.	A direct comparison of functional shares between
Maine and Québec would be difficult based only on
published data, since the composition of the individual
expenditure categories may differ between the U.S. and
Canadian Census protocols.
3.	Buyers normally respond to a decrease in price by
buying more units of a product or service. An increase
in quantity may be so large relative to the decrease in
price that total expenditure goes up. There is no reason
to believe that possibility does not exist for public
services just as it does for privately produced goods
and services.
4.	A report issued by the New England Environmental
Finance Center (2005: 2) suggests the development of
“a hypothetical multi-community service area model,
projecting likely per capita costs assuming shared
services and facilities, and comparing those costs with
the actual per capita expenditures of the individual
communities that comprise the service area.”
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